FIU Law Review
Volume 10

Number 2

Article 21

Spring 2015

An Act of Decryption Doctrine: Clarifying the Act of Production
Doctrine’s Application to Compelled Decryption
Joseph Jarone
Florida International University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Other Law Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Joseph Jarone, An Act of Decryption Doctrine: Clarifying the Act of Production Doctrine’s Application to
Compelled Decryption, 10 FIU L. Rev. 767 (2015).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.10.2.21

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 210 Side A

01/11/2016 08:19:25

18 - JARONE_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/4/16 11:36 PM

An Act of Decryption Doctrine: Clarifying the
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I. INTRODUCTION
New technology creates new legal challenges. With the coming of the
information age, encryption has become ubiquitous.1 Almost anyone can
easily acquire encryption software and use it to prevent unwanted third
parties from reading one’s private information.2 Encryption can be
incredibly powerful and nearly impossible to break.3 This technology
presents special problems for law enforcement because criminals use it to
hide their misdeeds.4 Due to encryption’s strength, sometimes the only way
to gain access to the encrypted evidence is with the assistance of the
accused.5 Compelling the accused to decrypt and assist in his or her own
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1 See Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment, Encryption, and the Forgotten State Interest, 61 UCLA
L. REV. DISC. 298, 302-03 (2014). Prior to 2007, there were no cases addressing encryption. Id. Now
there is a “small universe.” Id.; see, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov.
29, 2007), rev’d, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL
424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter
Doe III]; In re Decryption of a Seized Storage Sys., 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 116993 (E.D. Wis.
Apr. 19, 2013), overruled by 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 153162 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Feldman I]; In re Decryption of a Seized Storage Sys., 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL
153162 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013) [hereinafter Feldman II]; United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d
665 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
2 Encryption software is available commercially for a fairly low price. SYMANTIC, http://
www.symantec.com/drive-encryption (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); BITLOCKER DRIVE ENCRYPTION,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-GB/windows7/products/features/bitlocker (lasted visited Feb. 13,
2014); McAfee Endpoint Encryption, MCAFEE, http://www.mcafee.com/us/products/complete-dataprotection.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). Some software is even freely available on the Internet. See,
e.g., TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); GNU PRIVACY GUARD, http://
www.gnupg.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); AXCRYPT, http://www.axantum.com/axcrypt/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2014).
3 See sources cited, infra note 32.
4 See cases cited supra note 1; see also Statements by Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Committee, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014), http://epic.org/crypto/legislation/freeh_797.html (discussing national
security concerns with encryption).
5 See, e.g., Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at * 2; Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340; Fricosu, 841 F. Supp.
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prosecution runs headlong into the Fifth Amendment Right Against
Compelled Self-Incrimination.
This Comment addresses the Fifth Amendment implications of
compelled decryption. In addressing the issue of whether the government
can compel someone to decrypt, courts have applied the “act of production
doctrine.” This somewhat arcane doctrine was originally created to address
whether the physical production of physical documents receives a Fifth
Amendment privilege.6
This Comment will discuss encryption technology in section II.A, the
act of production doctrine in section II.B, and the current case law in
section II.C. In section III, this Comment will argue that the lower courts, in
applying this “act of production” doctrine, have done so incorrectly. In
particular, courts have failed to recognize the difference between the
physical production of documents and compelled decryption. The resulting
analysis is unduly confusing and provides more Fifth Amendment
protection than what the Constitution requires. This Comment will propose
an alternative application in section IV. Finally, in section V, this Comment
will discuss the insurmountable problem of the accused’s refusal to decrypt.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Encryption Background

C M
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2d at 1234. But see Motion to Dismiss Application, at 1-2, United States v. Decryption of a Seized Data
Storage Sys. (2:13-mj-00449), available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X1Q6MM164J82
(dismissing a case after the government was able to decrypt the device).
6 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 434 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring) (lamenting
abandonment of the pragmatic Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), standard and its replacement
with an “unduly technical focus on the act of production itself”); Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 77-78 (1986) (saying the act of
production doctrine “has led the fifth amendment into a realm of almost metaphysical abstraction”);
Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence: The
Consequences and the Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 489 (2001) (calling the act
of production doctrine “esoteric”); see, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. 391; United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605
(1984) [hereinafter Doe I]; Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) [hereinafter Doe II]; United States
v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
7 CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY 2 (1998), available at http://
link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-642-04101-3.
8 James Andrew, 2014 as the Year of Encryption: A (Very) Brief History of Encryption Policy,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Jan. 10, 2014), http://csis.org/publication/2014year-encryption-very-brief-history-encryption-policy.
9 See id.; Aaron Perkins, Comment, Encryption Use: Law and Anarchy on the Digital Frontier,
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Encryption has its historical roots in antiquity and was famously used
in World War II with the enigma machine.7 Prior to the Information Age,
encryption was closely regulated.8 Following the popularization of the
Internet, the government’s attempts at regulation ultimately failed.9
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Currently, some regulation of encryption exists, but for the most part,
people’s access to encryption is unhindered.10 Through the use of easily
accessible software one can encrypt both digital messages and the contents
of an electronic storage device.11
The principles governing encrypting messages are nothing new.12 A
simple “substitution cipher”13 such as the Caesar Cipher can encrypt the
contents of a message. Take for example the following quote from Justice
Jackson:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.14
Put through a simple substitution cipher, the quote becomes:
Mj xlivi mw erc jmbih wxev mr syv gsrwxmxyxmsrep
gsrwxippexmsr, mx mw xlex rs sjjmgmep, lmkl sv tixxc, ger
tviwgvmfi alex wlepp fi svxlshsb mr tspmxmgw, rexmsrepmwq,
vipmkmsr, sv sxliv qexxivw sj stmrmsr sv jsvgi gmxmdirw xs gsrjiww
fc asvh sv egx xlimv jemxl xlivimr.15
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41 HOUS. L. REV. 1625, 1629-40 (2005); Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization,
13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 434-41 (2013).
10 See sources cited supra note 9.
11 See sources cited supra note 2.
12 See PAAR, supra note 7, at 2.
13 See id. at 6 (“Historically [the substitution] type of cipher has been used many times, and it is a
good illustration of basic cryptography.”).
14 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
15 See PAAR, supra, note 7, at 18-19; Surveillance Self-Defense, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://ssd.eff.org/tech/encryption (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
16 See RAMAKRISHNA THURIMELLA & LEEMON C. BAIRD III, Network Security, in APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENSE : INFORMATION ENCRYPTION AND CYPHERING 2
(2011); PAAR, supra note 7, at 3-5.
17 See THURMIMELLA, supra at note 16, 2; PAAR, supra note 7, at 6-7.
18 See sources cited supra note 17.
19 See PAAR, supra, note 7, at 6.
20 See generally Richard T. Petras, Privacy for the Twenty-First Century: Cryptography, 94 THE
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The first quote is called the “plaintext”; the coded message is called
the “cipher text.”16 The plaintext was “encrypted” using an algorithm where
each character was moved to the right four characters (e.g., A became E; I
became M).17 Decryption requires moving each character of the cipher text
back four characters to put it in its original position.18
The cipher shown above is one of the simplest forms of encryption.19
One can most likely break it if given a few minutes and a piece of paper.
However, asymmetrical public key encryption,20 such as “Pretty Good
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Privacy” (PGP), a software program developed in 1991 by Philip
Zimmerman, provides a far more secure system of encryption.21 Encryption
software like PGP is both free online and simple to use.22
The information stored on a computer or electronic storage device can
also be encrypted. Encrypted scrambles the contents of an electronic storage
device, making it unreadable. There are a variety of encryption methods
including full-disk encryption (FDE), file and folder encryption, virtual
volume encryption, and hard disk password.23 FDE makes the entire device
inaccessible and unreadable if the user does not know the correct
password.24 Once the password has been entered, the device becomes
readable.25 File or folder encryption makes individual files or folders
inaccessible (e.g., encrypting “my documents”).26 Virtual volume
encryption provides protection for information stored inside of a container
(e.g., one’s C drive or a portable hard drive) and requires a password or key
to access the container.27 Finally, a hard disk password is much like FDE
except that where FDE uses software that interacts with one’s operating
system, with hard disk encryption, the user’s computer hardware prompts
the user for a key with no involvement from the operating system.28
While methods of cracking encryption exist,29 one of the problems
facing law enforcement is that without the passphrase to an encrypted
device, decryption becomes difficult or even impossible.30 Although
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MATHEMATICS TEACHER 689, 691-92 (2001). Asymmetrical key encryption requires both a public and a
private key. PAAR, supra note 7, at 6. A message encoded with a public key can only be decoded with
the private key. Id. As a result, the public key can be made public without risk that a third party could
use it to decode encrypted messages. Id. at 7-8. This allows one to be conveniently contacted with
encrypted messages with little risk of those messages being read by another. Id. at 7-8.
21 See generally OPENPGP, http://www.openpgp.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
22 Id.
23 See generally Surveillance Self-Defense, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://
ssd.eff.org/tech/disk-encryption (last visted Feb. 13, 2014); Eoghan Casey et al., The Growing Impact on
Full Disk Encryption on Digital Forensics, DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 8, 130 (2011); KAREN SCARFONE,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-111, GUIDE
TO STORAGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY FOR END USER DEVICES 3-1 - 3-4 (2007).
24 See sources cited supra note 23.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See generally J. Alex Halderman et al., Lest We Remember, Cold Boot Attack on Encryption
Keys, Proc. 2008 USENIX Security Symposium (2008), available at http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/pub/coldboot.pdf (cold-boot attack); MATT CURTIN, BRUTE FORCE:
CRACKING THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD 23-34 (2005) (brute-force attack); Casey et al., supra
note 23, at 132-34 (live acquisition technique).
30 Casey et al., supra note 23, at 130; Terzian, supra note 1, at 303-04; see, e.g., In re Boucher,
No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (Nov. 29, 2007); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir.
2012).
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encryption can keep one’s private information private, it can also bar law
enforcement’s attempts to investigate crimes involving computers.31
B. The Modern Interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”32 The Fifth Amendment does not grant one an unfettered “right to
remain silent.”33 Instead, before the privilege attaches, an act must satisfy
three elements. The act must be: (1) compelled, (2) incriminating, and (3)
testimonial.34
A seemingly obvious, but important, point is that these elements are
conjunctive.35 The government can, therefore, compel the accused to
incriminate himself or herself—so long as the compelled act is not
testimonial.36 Similarly, one can incriminate oneself with a testimonial
communication, but if the government does not compel it, it is not
privileged.37 The government may also compel a testimonial act so long as
one does not incriminate oneself when making it.38

31

See sources cited supra note 2, 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33 See Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 214 n.12 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 1314 (1973) (holding that compelling one to speak for the purposes of a voice exemplar was not
privileged).
34 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004).
35 Id.
36 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (permitting the government to compel a defendant to provide an incriminating blood
sample because it was non-testimonial); see also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910) (“But
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a
prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover, we need not consider how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. For when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or
by order, and even if the order goes too far, the evidence, if material, is competent.”).
37 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10; Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984); see also Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (noting that one may waive one’s Miranda rights, but the waiver
must be, among other things, voluntary); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the
defendant’s confession was voluntary when he approached the police during a psychotic episode and
confessed to a murder).
38 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (subpoenas in federal civil proceedings); Fed. R. Crim. P. 17
(subpoenas in federal criminal proceedings).
32
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1. Element 1: Compelled
To satisfy the compulsion element, the government must in some way
coerce action.39 When an act is done voluntarily, this element is not
present.40 For example, with a personal paper or document, the voluntary
act of writing the document would not be compelled, but a government
subpoena to produce the document would be.41 Thus, if someone writes in
his or her diary “I killed so-and-so” and the government seizes the diary,
then the diary receives no Fifth Amendment protection because its creation
was voluntary.42 However, if the government were to coerce the same
person to sign a confession saying much the same thing—or even affirm the
fact that he or she wrote the diary—then the compulsion element would be
present.43
2. Element 2: Incriminating
The incrimination element requires that an act either incriminate or
lead to the sicvoery of incriminating evidence.44 One does not necessarily
need to have committed a wrongdoing; even the innocent may fear selfincrimination.45 But the danger of self-incrimination must not be merely
“imagined and unsubstantial.”46 Furthermore, to satisfy this element, the

01/11/2016 08:19:25
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39 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding that to avoid the danger of compelled self-incrimination, the accused must be warned of
his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights).
40 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 610-11; see also South Dakota v. Neville 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (holding one
is not compelled to refuse an alcohol test although the results of the test tended to incriminate).
41 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-12. In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the defendant’s tax records were privileged. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. In Fisher, the taxpayer’s
accountant produced the records and the taxpayer’s lawyer was in current possession of the records. Id.
The Court found that the creation tax records were not compelled because the government did not
compel the records’ creation. Id.
42 Cf. Doe I, 465 U.S. at 610 (“Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no
compulsion is present.”) (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 611; see also Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) (“[T]he
requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a
promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. A
confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in custody,
and in answer to an examination conducted by them. But a confession obtained by compulsion must be
excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was
applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”) (footnotes omitted).
44 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27,
38 (2000); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (“The privilege afforded not only
extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but
likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant for a federal crime.”).
45 Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001).
46 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917) (“[W]e are of opinion that the danger to
be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the
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witness must incriminate himself or herself. That is, if one’s testimony just
incriminates someone else, the incrimination element is not satisfied.47
3. Element 3: Testimonial
The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between action that is
testimonial versus action that is non-testimonial.48 Testimonial acts require
one to make use of “the contents of his own mind.”49 Testimonial acts are
often verbal communications used for their contents, such as statements
made during custodial interrogation,50 before a grand jury,51 or during a
trial.52 Verbal communication will almost always be testimonial.53
Physical or real evidence is not privileged.54 For example, in
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination did not apply when the government obtained a

01/11/2016 08:19:25
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ordinary course of things—not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to
some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer
it to influence his conduct. We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary
course of law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to obstruct
the administration of justice.”); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 (1968); see also Hoffman,
341 U.S. at 486 (“The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so
doing he would incriminate himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of
incrimination.”).
47 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is a
personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him. As
Mr. Justice Holmes put it: ‘A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its
production.’ The Constitution explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness ‘against
himself’: it necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another.”) (citations
omitted); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 225 (1975) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or
statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial.”).
48 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
408 (1976); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000).
49 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988) (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957);
See, e.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43 (using contents of the mind to put together documents in response to
subpoena is testimonial); Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128 (testifying orally to the whereabouts of records
required the witness to use the contents of his own mind); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 597 (1990) (footnotes omitted) (“Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to
communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the ‘trilemma’ of
truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial
component.”).
50 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51 See, e.g., Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
52 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
53 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) (“There are very few instances in which a verbal statement,
either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts. The vast majority of verbal statements
thus will be testimonial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the privilege.”) (footnotes omitted).
54 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966) (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245, 252-53 (1910)); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1990); see also United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (standing in a police lineup non-testimonial).
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blood sample from the defendant.55 Even one’s verbal and written acts may
be non-testimonial so long as they are used for their physical characteristics
and not their substantive content.56 For example, voice exemplars57 and
handwriting exemplars58 are non-testimonial because they are used for their
physical properties and not what is said.59
The difference between a testimonial act and a non-testimonial act is
the difference between requiring a defendant to answer an interrogatory and
requiring a defendant to provide a handwriting exemplar.60 Both can
incriminate him or her, but with the former, the defendant is required to
make use of the “contents of his own mind.” 61
Physical actions may, however, make implicit testimonial
communications.62 The following sections address the question of whether
being physically compelled to produce documents is testimonial.
i. The Act of Production Doctrine

55
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Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597 (physical qualities of speech not testimonial).
57 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 222 (1967) (holding that requiring the accused to speak for identification purposes was nontestimonial).
58 United States v. Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
59 See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590-92.
60 Compare United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 41 (2000) (stating that requiring a defendant
to produce several thousand records was “tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories” and was
therefore testimonial), with Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67 (stating that a handwriting exemplar, taken for
its physical characteristics, was non-testimonial).
61 See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
62 See section II.C.i infra.
63 See section III.C infra.
64 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36.
65 See United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976); Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984)
(O’Conner, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents
of private papers of any kind”); accord Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; Baltimore City
56
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The Court has established the “act of production” doctrine in response
to the issue of whether the production of a physical object (such as a
personal or business paper) is a testimonial act. The lower courts have been
applying this “act of production” doctrine to compelled decryption cases, so
understanding it is of particular importance.63 First, I will describe it
generally and then discuss the small number of Supreme Court cases
applying the doctrine.
The Court has distinguished between the content of a paper and the act
of producing the paper.64 While the content of a paper is certainly
testimonial, its creation is voluntary (i.e., it lacks the compulsion element
and is therefore not privileged).65 The act of producing a paper is
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compelled, but whether it is testimonial is a more difficult question.66
No bright line rule exists to determine whether the production of a
paper is a testimonial act.67 Instead it depends on the “facts and
circumstances” of each case.68 Whether the production of a paper is
testimonial depends on whether that production makes implicit, testimonial
communications.69 Normally, when one produces a paper, one tacitly
admits to the government that the paper exists and that one has control over
it.70 These tacit admissions may make the physical production of the paper
testimonial.71
I say “may” because the government has the opportunity to “rebut” the
claim that the production is testimonial.72 The government may “produce
evidence that possession, existence, and authentication [is] a ‘foregone
conclusion.’”73 In other words, the accused may claim that he or she is
making a testimonial communication, but if the government already knows
what the production would implicitly communicate, then the production
loses its testimonial quality and becomes a non-testimonial act.74
It is worth acknowledging that the exact meaning of “foregone
conclusion” has proven an interpretative challenge because the Court has
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Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (“[A] person may not claim the
Amendment’s protections based upon the incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of
the thing demanded.”). The rule that private papers are not privileged was established first in United
States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). In that case, the Court brought the prior precedent of Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), into question. See Fisher, 425 U.S. 408-09. Boyd had held that the
contents of private papers were privileged because using one’s private books and papers was not
“substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.” Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-35.
The Court distinguished Boyd by pointing out that the papers were the product of the accountant’s
efforts and not the accused. The Court, in Fisher, left open the question of whether its act of production
doctrine would apply to individually produced papers. 425 U.S. at 414; see also id. at 421 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (urging the Court not to extend Fisher to private papers).
66 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (stating that in a compelled production case, the “more difficult” issue
is whether production is testimonial).
67 Id. Compare id. (finding the production of records to be non-testimonial after a factual
inquiry), with Doe I, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (finding the production of records to be testimonial after a
factual inquiry) and United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (finding the production of records to
be testimonial after a factual inquiry).
68 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
69 Id.
70 See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 613 n.11 (not showing disagreement with the position that subpoenas to
compel production “with few exceptions” have communicative aspects).
71 See, e.g., Doe I, 465 U.S. 605; Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27.
72 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13.
73 Id. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411) (“[The defendant] argued that by producing the records,
he would tacitly admit their existence and his possession. . . . These allegations were sufficient to
establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government
was foreclosed from rebutting respondent’s claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and
authentication were a ‘foregone conclusion.’”).
74 See id.; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2012).
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failed to define it clearly.75 Commentators and courts have struggled to
conceptualize the doctrine.76 In addition to the conceptual difficulties, the
Supreme Court has not answered the question of how much evidence the
government must have before something becomes a “foregone
conclusion.”77
a. Fisher v. United States
The act of production doctrine was borne in United States v. Fisher. In
this case, the defendant, a taxpayer, was facing both civil and criminal
liability under federal income tax laws.78 The taxpayer’s tax documents had
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75 Mosteller, supra note 6, at 508-09 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never given real definition to
[the foregone conclusion] doctrine.”); Alito, supra note 6, at 49 (“The Court also left substantial doubt
about what it meant by ‘a foregone conclusion.’”); Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled
Production of Personal Documents After United States v. Hubbell - New Protection for Private Papers?,
29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 167 (2002) (“[O]n the most difficult and uncertain point—the question of when
the foregone conclusion doctrine applies to an act of production of documents—the Court once again
declined to provide a definitive answer.”).
76 I will not be addressing this difficult question. For a sampling of the variety of the views on
this subject see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment
Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1987) (“[W]hen an implicit as opposed to an explicit communication is
involved, it is necessary to consider whether the government is really asking a ‘question’ through the
subpoena. Granted, the defendant’s response to a documentary subpoena always reveals that the item
does or does not exist; the government cannot eliminate the implicit question about the document’s
existence no matter how it phrases the subpoena’s demand. But if the government already knows the
answer to that question and is truly uninterested in the implicit answer provided by production, the
witness’ gratuitous communication of it should not violate the Fifth Amendment. In short, the Fisher
decision suggests that constitutional rights are not violated by implicit communications that are inherent
in a response to a documentary subpoena where those communications are unwanted because, though
technically admissible, they are not substantially relevant to the prosecution’s case given its other
evidence.”) (footnotes omitted); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that the
foregone conclusion doctrine bears a family resemblance to the independent source doctrine from use
and derivative-use immunity cases); Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 188 (2007)
(“The government’s prior knowledge, however, may be relevant to show that it had an independent
source for the information and, thus, did not make derivative use of the act of production and will not
make use of it at trial.”); Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained
and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 277-89 (2004) (arguing that the foregone
conclusion doctrine relates to the cognitive process of the witness and not the knowledge of the
government).
77 See sources cited supra note 76. Several lower courts have adopted the “reasonable
particularity” standard to determine when something is a “foregone conclusion.” Under this standard,
the government must know with reasonable particularity the location and existence of the documents it
subpoenas. See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Hubbell, the lower
appellate court, the D.C. Circuit, had adopted the reasonable particularity standard, but the Supreme
Court declined to pass judgment on its validity. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 33, 44
(2000). Regardless, courts in the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits still apply the reasonable
particularity standard post-Hubbell. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29,
1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); Ponds, 454 F.3d at 324; Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir.
2012); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated Apr. 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004).
78 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 393-94 (1976).
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been prepared by his accountant, and the taxpayer gave them to his
attorney.79 The government subpoenaed those documents.80 The taxpayer’s
attorney asserted the privilege against self-incrimination on his client’s
behalf.81
The Court considered the issue of whether a subpoena to produce the
tax records was a testimonial act.82 It noted that the compelled production of
records does not require oral testimony or require the taxpayer to “restate,
repeat, or affirm the truth the contents of the documents sought.”83
However, production of the tax records may have implicit testimonial
qualities.84 In some cases, production may implicitly communicate that the
records exist and are controlled by the taxpayer.85 Production may also
authenticate the documents.86
But then the Court turned abruptly from what the defendant may
implicitly communicate to what the government knew about what is
implicitly communicated.87 The Court found that the government could
independently confirm and verify the existence of the taxpayer’s records;
the taxpayer’s accountant had created the records, and the records were the
kind that an accountant would normally create.88 The production would not
tell the government anything it did not already know and would not
increase the “sum total” of the government’s knowledge.89 Therefore, the
Court found that production of the records to be insufficiently testimonial to
meet the Fifth Amendment’s “testimonial” element.90
The Fisher analysis was, apparently, part of the Court’s jurisprudence
all along.91 The Fisher Court said that the “act of production” analysis even
applies to things like handwriting exemplars.92 When one provides a
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Id.
Id. at 394-95.
81 Id. at 395-96. While irrelevant to this discussion, Fisher also held that, although the attorney
was an “agent” of the taxpayer, under Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the attorney could
not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege on the taxpayer’s behalf. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 397-98; see also
cases cited supra note 49.
82 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-14.
83 Id. at 409; see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (holding that a grand jury
could compel a custodian of records to produce a company’s records but not to orally testify as to more
records if that testimony could incriminate).
84 Id. at 410-11.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 412-13, 413 n.12; see generally FED. R. EVID. 901 (Authentication and Identification).
87 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 411-12.
92 Id.; see United States v. Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (holding that a handwriting
80
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handwriting exemplar, one implicitly admits that one can write and admits
that what he or she is providing is his or her handwriting.93 But the
government already knows that people can write; it is a “truism.”94 And the
government already knows that the exemplar is someone’s handwriting; it
is “self-evident.”95 Thus, the things communicated were “foregone
conclusions.”96 This would mean that this act of production analysis is at
work in more than just cases where one is compelled to produce documents.
b. United States v. Doe (Doe I)

01/11/2016 08:19:25

exemplar is non-testimonial).
93 Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 606-07.
100 Id. at 608.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 612.
103 See id. 611-12.
104 Id. at 608.
105 Id. at 611-12.
106 Id. at 617.
107 See id. 613-14, 613 n.11.
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Eight years later, in United States v. Doe97 (Doe I), the Court revisited
the act of production doctrine.98 In this case, the government sought to
compel records from the defendant with a grand jury subpoena.99 The
defendant claimed that the content of the records was privileged, and the act
of producing the records was privileged.100 The lower courts sided with the
defense on both claims.101
On the first point, the Court rejected the claim that the content of the
records was privileged.102 As discussed in section II.B.1, if a record is
created voluntarily, it lacks the element of “compulsion.”103 The defendant
argued that it should make a difference that the records in his own case
were personally created, but in Fisher, the taxpayer’s accountant had
created the records.104 The Court rejected this as a distinction without a
difference and found that both records were created voluntarily.105
On the second point however, the Court sided with the defendant.106
The Court relied on the findings of the lower courts that the production
would involve a testimonial communication.107 It also sided with the lower
courts’ finding that the government had no knowledge of whether the
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compelled documents existed and were in the defendant’s control.108
The Court, in dicta, helped to clarify the somewhat perplexing act of
production doctrine from Fisher.109 This dictum provides a framework for
the act of production and foregone conclusion analyses.110 First the one
seeking to claim the privilege must show that the compelled production has
implicit testimonial qualities.111 Then, the burden shifts to the government
to rebut the claim of privilege.112 To “rebut” this privilege, the government
must produce evidence that the testimonial qualities implicitly
communicated are already a foregone conclusion and therefore nontestimonial.113
c. Doe v. United States (Doe II)
Four years after Doe I, the Court decided another case, Doe v. United
States114 (Doe II), again addressing the act of production doctrine.115 As part
of a grand jury investigation, the government sought records in the
possession of foreign banks.116 The government could not access those
records without the defendant’s assistance.117 It needed the defendant to
execute a directive to release the foreign bank records and compelled him to
do so with a grand jury subpoena.118 The directive was carefully written as
to not make reference to a specific account, to a specific bank, to the
existence of an account, or to an account owned by the defendant.119 Thus
signing the directive did not require the defendant to admit anything.120 The
defendant refused to sign the directive on self-incrimination grounds.121 The
Court rejected the defendant’s claim and found that it was not sufficiently
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Id. at 613-14.
See id. at 613 n.11.
110 See id.
111 The Court, although it did not explicitly show agreement with the district court, did not
express disagreement with the lower court’s statement that “[w]ith few exceptions enforcement of the
subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and
that they are authentic.” Id. at 613 n.11 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This seems to show that this initial burden is easily met in most cases.
112 Id.
113 Id. The Court did not say what evidentiary standard the government would need to meet. See
id.
114 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 202-03.
117 Id. at 203-04.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 204-05, 215.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 204.
109
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testimonial.122
The Court reaffirmed Fisher, saying that “an accused’s communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information.”123 The execution would not assert or disclose any information
itself.124 Instead, it would just open up “a potential source of evidence.”125
Thus, compelled execution of the directive would be more like a
handwriting or voice exemplar because it lacked testimonial significance.126
Significantly, unlike either Doe I or Fisher, the Court did not require
the government to know what the directive would produce.127 The Court
looked narrowly to whether signing the directive would require the
defendant to “make a statement.”128 The directive made no statement as to
whether evidence existed, and it did not “point the Government towards
hidden accounts or otherwise provide information that will assist the
prosecution in uncovering evidence.”129 Therefore, while incriminating, the
directive was not testimonial.130 Consequently, the defendant could not
claim the privilege against self-incrimination.131
d. United States v. Hubbell
The last time the Court addressed the act of production doctrine was in
United States v. Hubbell.132 Here, the defendant had entered into a plea
bargain where he would provide the government with information relating
to an ongoing investigation.133 The prosecutor served the defendant with a
subpoena calling for the production of eleven categories of documents.134
The defendant then invoked his Fifth Amendment Privilege.135 In response,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002,136 the prosecution provided the defendant

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
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136

Id. at 219.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id.
See 215-16.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 217 n.15.
Id.
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994).
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
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with immunity for the production of the papers.137 The defendant then
produced 13,120 documents.138 These documents led to a prosecution,
despite the grant of immunity.139 The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed
the indictment because 18 U.S.C. § 6002 immunized the defendant from
future prosecutions.140
The government argued that it did not need to offer immunity in the
first place because the production was insufficiently testimonial.141 The
Court rejected this however, saying that the production of the 13,120
documents “was tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking
the witness to disclose the existence and location of particular documents
fitting certain broad descriptions.”142
The government then argued that the production of the documents was
insufficiently testimonial because the defendant’s control over the
documents was a foregone conclusion.143 The Court rejected this argument
because prior to the defendant’s production of the documents, the
government did not have “any prior knowledge” that the documents existed.
Because the facts of this case were so unfavorable to the government, the
court failed to explain what it meant by “foregone conclusion,” except that
“whatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale, the facts of this
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(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
137 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 46. In Kastigar, the Court interpreted this grant of immunity to be co-extensive with the
privilege against self-incrimination such that the government cannot use either the testimony or the
derivatives of the testimony in a future criminal action. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S 441, 453
(1972). The only permissible way that the government could successfully prosecute subsequent to
granting immunity is if it is based on information independent of the immunized testimony. Id. at 46061. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 does granted not total immunity to all subsequent prosecutions (i.e., “transactional
immunity”). Id. at 462. Rather, once immunity has been granted, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
show that proposed evidence comes from an independent source. Id. at 461-62. In Hubbell, the
documents themselves were not going to be used against the defendant, they were the “first step in a
chain of evidence” leading to the indictment. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42. Thus the government had made
derivational use of the documents and could not show that it had attained the information necessary for
these second prosecutions from an independent source. Id. at 45-46.
141 Id. at 44.
142 Id. at 41.
143 Id. at 44.
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case plainly fall outside of it.”144
C. Encryption Case Law
Few courts have thus far had the opportunity to address whether the
compelled decryption of an electronic device is testimonial.145 The courts
that have addressed the problem have made use of the act of production
doctrine discussed in II.B.3. These “compelled production” cases are
factually distinct from one another and so this Comment will briefly discuss
the factual and procedural circumstances of the cases and how they have
applied the act of production doctrine to compelled decryption.
1. In re Boucher
In re Boucher146 was one of the first encryption cases. On December
17, 2006, the defendant passed through a routine border checkpoint and an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent searched his vehicle.147
Within the vehicle, the ICE agent found a laptop computer.148 He opened it
to discover several thousand images, some of which were pornographic.149
Among the prodigious amount of pornography, he found a file titled “2yo
getting raped during diaper change.” He was unable to open it.150 However,
he could see that the file had been opened in the past month.151
A second ICE agent was then called in, this one an expert in child
pornography.152 He read the defendant his Miranda rights, which were
waived.153 The defendant told the agent that he downloaded a lot of
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144 Id.; see also Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984) (holding that the defendant’s possession and
control of records was not a foregone conclusion but neglecting to further define the doctrine). Engaging
in a bit of speculation as to what went in chambers on this point, Justice Stevens wrote both the dissent
in Doe II and the majority opinion in Hubbell. Justice Stevens all but ignores Doe II (aside from his
dissent), favoring Doe I and Fisher. Appearing to be no fan of the foregone conclusion doctrine, he
dismisses the foregone conclusion saying “this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale” with foregone
conclusion in scare quotes. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44. Whether this marks a sign that a future Court
would abandon the foregone conclusion approach is worth considering. Also worth considering is the
fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas would abandon the entire act of production analysis in favor of a
rule saying that the accused should never need to assist the government in one’s own prosecution. See
id., at 49-54. But these considerations are outside the scope of this Comment.
145 See cases sited supra note 1.
146 No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007).
147 Id. at *1. See generally United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (establishing the
border search exception to probable cause).
148 Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. See generally cases cited supra note 31.
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Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1.
Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at *2.
158 Id.
159 Id. For more information on the software used in this case, see generally Encryption Family,
SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/encryption (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
160 Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. The flaws in this request are obvious under Hubbell, 530 U.S. 26 (2000). The government
had no idea if any papers existed; therefore production of the papers would implicitly communicate the
existence of such papers—a testimonial act.
164 Id.
165 Id. at *3-4.
166 Id.
167 Id.
155
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pornography, and occasionally, would mistakenly download child
pornography, but he would delete it upon discovery.154 The agent then
asked the defendant to show him the pornography.155 The defendant
complied and entered in a password into his “drive Z”—the agent did not
see what the password was.156 The agent looked through the computer and a
found a video titled “preteen bondage,” which appeared to depict an
underage girl.157 After finding even more child pornography, the defendant
was then arrested and the computer was powered down.158
When the computer was powered back on, law enforcement found it
encrypted using PGP encryption software.159 The software made the disk
unreadable despite a Secret Service forensics expert’s best efforts.160 It
could take years to decrypt.161
The government then subpoenaed the defendant to hand over all
documents that reflected the password to the laptop.162 The court did not
address the demand for papers because the government refined its request at
a hearing and demanded that the defendant enter the password himself.163
The government promised not to use the defendant’s act of entering in the
password against him.164
The magistrate first determined that the act of entering in the password
would be testimonial.165 The act of entering in the password would
communicate both the contents of the defendant’s mind and that he had
access to the device.166 It did not matter to the court that the government
had promised not to look at the password because the defendant would still
implicitly communicate that he knew the password regardless of whether
the government learned the actual password.167
The magistrate concluded that the government did not meet its burden
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under the foregone conclusion doctrine.168 The court interpreted the
government’s requests as either for the password itself or for the production
of the files from drive Z.169 A request for the password itself would be a
request for something purely communicative and so the act of production
doctrine would not apply.170 The request for the files from drive Z would
fail because the government only knew of some of the device’s files and did
not know the entire contents of the device.171 Therefore, decryption would
increase the “sum total” of the government’s knowledge.
In In re Boucher172 (Boucher II), the government appealed the
magistrate’s order to the district court judge.173 This time, the government
had refined its request to just be for the unencrypted version of “drive z.”174
The district court found that the government’s knowledge of the drive’s
existence, the defendant’s control of the drive, and the drive’s authenticity
was a foregone conclusion.175 Therefore, the decryption of the device could
be compelled.176 The district court disposed of the magistrate’s argument,
saying that the government did not need to know of the incriminating
contents of the files.177
2. United States v. Fricosu
United States v. Fricosu,178 a case from the District of Colorado, also
resulted in the defendant being compelled to decrypt because of the
foregone conclusion doctrine.179 In this case, the prosecution sought files
contained in an encrypted laptop computer, which resisted FBI attempts at
decryption.180 The prosecution petitioned the court for a writ compelling the
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Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6.
170 Id.; see also United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668-69 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(holding that the government could not compel the defendant to communicate the password of an
encrypted device because it was not a physical production).
171 Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473 at *1.
172 No: 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
173 Id.
174 Id. at *2.
175 Id. at *4.
176 Id.
177 Id. at *3. On this point the Boucher II court relied on the controlling Second Circuit precedent
of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), which held
that the government was not required to know the contents of an allegedly altered calendar when it could
state with reasonable particularity the existence and location of the calendar. In re Jury Subpoena, 1
F.3d at 93. Thus, the Court stated that the government was not required to know the content of
individual files so long as it could show that the files existed. Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *3.
178 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012).
179 Id. at 1237-38.
180 Id. at 1234.
169
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defendant to decrypt the computer and assist with the execution of the
warrant.181
The district court considered two issues.182 The first was whether the
government knew of the existence and location of the computer’s files.183
The court relied in large part on the Boucher II court’s analysis to find that
the government did not need to be able to know specific content of the files;
knowing the “existence and location” of the computer’s files was
sufficient.184
The second issue was whether the government could show that the
defendant could access the computer.185 On this point the court found:
“[T]he government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the [device] belongs to [the defendant], or, in the alternative,
that she was its sole or primary user, who, in any event, can access the
encrypted contents of that laptop computer.”186 The court relied on the
following facts: (1) the computer had been seized from the defendant’s
room; (2) the computer was named “RS.WORKGROUP.Romana”
(Romana being the defendant’s first name); and (3) the agents had recorded
a conversation between the defendant and her husband where the defendant
admitted to owning and being able to access the laptop.187 Therefore, the
court found that the compelled decryption of the laptop did not violate the
Fifth Amendment.

181
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Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1949).
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which
has jurisdiction.
182 See Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. In my research, the Fricosu court is the only court to identify a preponderance of the
evidence standard as the burden the government must meet before it may compel decryption. The
Fricosu court does not cite any authority in stating that the government must meet this burden. No other
court has addressed or accepted this standard of proof requirement. However, as the Eleventh Circuit has
noted, the foregone conclusion doctrine bears a resemblance to the independent source doctrine from
Kastigar. See Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012); see also supra notes 135, 138. Several
courts have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to the question of whether the discovery of
evidence following a grant of immunity stems from an independent source. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 9 F.3d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard to the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule).
So perhaps that is where the evidentiary standard in Fricosu comes from.
187 See Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
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3. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011
(Doe III)
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011188 (Doe
III) stands as the only circuit court case to consider the issue of compelled
decryption, and the only case, in any jurisdiction, where the defendant was
not compelled to decrypt. This Eleventh Circuit case has also provided the
most detailed analysis of the act of production doctrine’s application to
encryption.189
In 2010, the FBI investigated a YouTube.com account suspected of
sharing child pornography.190 The user of the account accessed the account
from three different internet protocol addresses (IP address). The FBI linked
these addresses to three different hotels.191 The only common individual
staying in the hotels during the relevant times was the defendant.192 The FBI
executed a search warrant and seized two laptops and five external hard
drives.193 However, the hard drives had been encrypted using TruCrypt’s
Hidden Volume software.194 One of the features of the Hidden Volume
software is that it prevents one from determining whether an encrypted
device is empty or full.195 The device could be either full of information or
completely empty (aside from the encryption) and no one could know the
difference.196
The government sought to subpoena the decryption of a device that it
suspected had child pornography on it.197 The defendant refused and
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination.198 The prosecution then
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Y K
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670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
This case also misreads the act of production cases. See section III.
190 Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1339.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. See generally Hidden Volume, TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume
(last visited Mar., 25, 2014) (“It may happen that you are forced by somebody to reveal the password to
an encrypted volume. There are many situations where you cannot refuse to reveal the password (for
example, due to extortion). Using a so-called hidden volume allows you to solve such situations without
revealing the password to your volume.”) (footnotes omitted).
195 Id. The TrueCrypt hidden volume basically allows the user to create a “Russian nesting doll”
of encryption. See id. (“[F]ree space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data when
the volume is created and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be distinguished from random
data.”) (footnotes omitted). The software encrypts a volume, resulting it that volume appearing to be
random information. Id. Then a sub-part of the encrypted drive is encrypted again, but because the
volumes appear to just be random data, despite the number of times it has been encrypted, it is difficult
to impossible to determine whether the sub-drive is full or empty. Id.
196 Id.; see also Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 (discussing TrueCrypt software).
197 Id. at 1339.
198 Id.
189
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offered use immunity199 for the act of decryption but not for the derivational
evidence.200 The defendant again refused, claiming that use immunity
would be insufficient to protect him from incriminating himself.201 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendant and held that the defendant’s act
of decryption was testimonial and the grant of use immunity was
insufficient to immunize the defendant’s action.202
The Eleventh Circuit first provided a broad overview of the Supreme
Court’s act of production doctrine.203 It identified that an act is nontestimonial if either the compulsion is merely with regard to a physical act
and is non-communicative or the compulsion is communicative but this
communication is a foregone conclusion.204
The court held first that decryption was a testimonial act.205 Decryption
would require the defendant to admit that he knew the files existed and
knew the location of the files.206 Decryption would also require him to
admit to possessing the files, controlling the files, being able to access the
files, and being able to decrypt the device.207
The court then turned to whether the implicit testimony was a foregone
conclusion.208 On this point, the court put heavy emphasis on the
government’s expert whom, during a hearing, was unable to say whether
the encrypted device actually had anything on it.209 The most he could say
was that the device could have files on it, but TrueCrypt’s Hidden Volume
functionality prevented one from determining whether a device was full or
empty.210
The court held that the foregone conclusion rationale was inapplicable
because the government could not show that it knew any files even existed

01/11/2016 08:19:25
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199 For a general description of immunity, see generally supra notes 135, 138 and accompanying
text. Use immunity is distinct from use and derivational use immunity. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1338.
Use immunity is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment, id. at 1350, while derivational use
immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment Privilege, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 462 (1972).
200 Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1338.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1341.
203 Id. at 1341-46.
204 Id. at 1346.
205 Id.; see also id. at 1341 n.13 (“If the decryption of the hard drives would not constitute
testimony, one must ask, ‘Why did the Government seek, and the district court grant, immunity for
Doe’s decryption?’ The answer is obvious: Doe’s decryption would be testimonial.”).
206 Id. at 1346.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1340, 1345.
210 Id.; see supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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(let alone where they were located).211 The government argued that the files
could exist, but the court dismissed the argument stating that “the
Government physically possesses the media devices, but it does not know
what, if anything, is held on the encrypted drives.”212 Nor could the
government show that it knew within any degree of certainty that the
defendant could decrypt.213 Thus, the court reasoned, the case was like
Hubbell and unlike Fisher because the government lacked knowledge of the
encrypted files.214
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished, but did not show disagreement
with, both Boucher II and Fricosu. In those cases, unlike this one, the
prosecution at least had information that something was on the computer.215
The Eleventh Circuit seemed to agree with the other courts that the
government did not need to go so far as to show knowledge of the specific
content of other devices.216 But the government at least needed to know that
something existed on the drive.217 Specifically, the government would need
to be able to show that a file did exist, either because it knew the account’s
name or because it knew “that (1) the file existed in some specific location,
(2) the file is possessed by the target of the subpoena, and (3) the file is
authentic.”218
4. In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System (Feldman)

211
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Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347-49.
Id.
213 Id. at 1346 (“[N]othing in the record illustrates that the Government knows with reasonable
particularity that Doe is even capable of accessing the encrypted portions of the drives.”).
214 Id. at 1347.
215 Id. at 1348, 1349 n.27.
216 Id. at 1348.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1349 n.28.
219 2:13-mj-00449, 2013 BL 153162 (E.D. Wis. Apr., 19 2013), available at http://
ia601700.us.archive.org/6/items/gov.uscourts.wied.63043/gov.uscourts.wied.63043.3.0.pdf.
220 Id. at *1.
221 Id.
222 Id.
212
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In In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System219 (Feldman), the
prosecution sought to compel the decryption of several external hard drives
seized during a search of the defendant’s home.220 The government believed
the devices seized contained child pornography, and the forensic examiners
were able to determine that they had transferred over 1,000 files over the
file sharing network E-mule.221 Most of the file names implicated child
pornography.222
The magistrate adopted the standards set by the other courts, and
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looked, first, to determine whether the government knew the device had
content, and, second, whether the defendant could access the device.223 On
this first point, the court, distinguishing Doe III, found that it was a
foregone conclusion that the device had contents and that the contents were
child pornography.224 On the second point however, the court concluded
that the government could not show that the defendant was able to decrypt
the device and thus held the government could not compel decryption.225
On reconsideration however, the government was able to present more
evidence that the defendant was able to access the device.226 This evidence
was in a somewhat similar form as the evidence the court considered in
Fricosu and included circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the
device, thus increasing the likelihood that the defendant could decrypt.227
The court then ordered decryption.228 Litigation on this issue abruptly
ceased however when the prosecution was able to fully decrypt the
defendant’s computer, finding over four hundred thousand pictures and
videos of child pornography.229
III. ANALYSIS
The current collection of compelled decryption cases have some
general similarities. Almost every major court case has turned on the issue
of whether the foregone conclusion doctrine applies.230 In other words, in
these cases, the accused met his or her initial burden of showing that
decryption was a testimonial act, and the government has sought to show
that the implicit communications were a foregone conclusion.231
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Id. at *4.
Id.
225 Id. at *5.
226 Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013), available at http://
www.courthousenews.com/2013/05/31/decryptorder.pdf.
227 Id. at *2 (“d. In addition to numerous files of child pornography, the decrypted part of
Feldman’s storage system contains detailed personal financial records and documents belonging to [the
defendant]. e. The decrypted part of [the defendant’s] storage system contains dozens of personal
photographs of [the defendant]. . . . [T]he defendant] is a competent software developer who could have
learned how to use encryption.”) The court did not say it was applying a preponderance of the evidence
standard to the question of whether the defendant could decrypt. See id. The court did not say what
evidentiary standard it was applying at all. See id.
228 Id.
229 See Motion to Dismiss Application, at 1-2, United States v. Decryption of a Seized Data
Storage
System
(2:13-mj-00449),
available
at
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
X1Q6MM164J82.
230 See, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2008 WL 424718, at *3 (D. Vt. 2009); United States
v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1347-49 (11th Cir.
2012); Feldman II, 2:13-mj-00449, 2013 BL 153162, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013).
231 See Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984).
224
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Not enough care and attention has been paid to what is testimonial
about decryption—i.e., what decryption implicitly communicates. Courts
have said that decryption communicates that data is located on an encrypted
device exist and that the accused controls it.232 This assumption misreads
the act of production line of cases and fails to take into account the
seemingly obvious fact that decryption and the physical production of
documents are different actions. Different actions will implicitly
communicate different things.
First, I will argue that decryption communicates that a witness can
access a device. Second, I will argue that decryption does not communicate
the existence of a device’s contents or accused’s control over of those
contents. Therefore, to compel decryption, it must be a foregone conclusion
that a witness is able to access a device. However, neither existence nor
control needs to be a foregone conclusion.
A. Decryption Communicates that One Has Access to an Encrypted Device
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232 See In re Boucher, No: 2:08-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, *5 (D. Va. Nov. 29 2007); Boucher,
2009 WL 424718, at *3; Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1346. The court in Fricosu did not explicitly say that
decryption had testimonial qualities but instead jumped to the foregone conclusion analysis. Fricosu,
841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. During its foregone conclusion analysis, it noted that existence and control
were both foregone conclusions so the court at least assumed that decryption presumptively
communicated these qualities. Id.; see also id. at 1236 (discussing Boucher and the court’s analysis
there).
233 See generally section II.A supra.
234 For the purposes of clarity, the general noun used for the one the government is attempting to
compel will either be the witness, the defendant, or the accused. This is not to indicate that anyone
compelled to decrypt is necessarily filling one of those roles.
235 See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4 (D. Va. Nov. 19, 2007); Doe III,
670 F.3d at 1349; Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013). Fricosu implicitly
assumed it because it held that the defendant’s ability access the devices was a foregone conclusion.
Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. Boucher II did not conduct a foregone conclusion analysis or say
whether decryption implicitly communicates an ability to access a device. See Boucher, 2009 WL
424718, at *3-4. But because a government agent had already watched the defendant enter the password
in that case, the court most likely thought it a non-issue.
236 See discussion supra part II.C.i-v.
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Decrypting a device necessarily requires one enter a correct
password.233 Thus if the government seizes an encrypted device, compels
the accused to decrypt the device, and the accused does so, it necessarily
means that the accused knows the password and has access to the device.234
This should be enough to establish that decryption is testimonial.
Boucher I, Doe III, and Feldman explicitly acknowledged that
decryption communicates one’s ability to access a device.235 This is a
unique feature of encryption and inapplicable to more “traditional” act of
production doctrine cases.236 But this divergence is proper. Physically
producing documents requires a different action than entering a password
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into a computer—different actions will have different implicit
communications.237 For example, in Hubbell the government sought to
compel the defendant to physically assemble thousands of documents.238 In
comparison, in Doe II, the government sought to compel the defendant to
execute a directive that would provide the government access to potential
evidence.239 In Hubbell, the defendant communicated that the documents
existed, were controlled by him, and were authentic.240 In Doe II, all the
defendant communicated was an ability to write.241 While the end result
remained the same, the government got access to incriminating documents,
the defendants’ actions differed significantly and thus made different
implicit communications.
This is not to say that because the act of decryption has fundamental
differences from the act of production that courts should not apply the
Fisher line of cases. Instead, courts should embrace the differences between
decryption and production and acknowledge these differences in their
analysis.
B. Before the Government May Compel Decryption, the Defendant’s
Ability to Access the Device Must Be a Foregone Conclusion

237
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Compare Hubbell v. United States, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (quoting Curcio v. United States,
354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)) (“It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of
‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the
subpoena.”) with Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 217 (1988) (“[D]irecting the recipient of a communication to do
something is not an assertion of fact or, at least in this context, a disclosure of information. In its
testimonial significance, the execution of such a directive is analogous to the production of a
handwriting sample or voice exemplar: it is a non-testimonial act.”).
238 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
239 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 204-06.
240 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.
241 See Doe II, 487 U.S. at 217 (describing the execution like a handwriting exemplar); see also
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (saying a handwriting exemplar communicates one’s
ability to write).
242 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11; Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335,
1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012).
243 See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1343 n.19; Feldman II, 2:13-mj-00449, 2013 BL 153162, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. May 21, 2013); accord Doe I, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13.
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Simply because a witness is able to meet his or her initial burden of
showing that the act of decryption is testimonial does not mean the analysis
is over.242 The next step is to consider whether the government can produce
sufficient evidence to show the defendant’s ability to decrypt is a forgone
conclusion.243 If the defendant’s ability to decrypt is a foregone conclusion,
then the defendant would “add little or nothing to the sum total of the
government’s information by conceding” to the fact that the defendant can
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decrypt.244
Courts addressing this issue, in one way or another, have considered
whether the defendant’s ability to access an encrypted device is a foregone
conclusion.245 The clearest example of a defendant’s ability to decrypt being
a foregone conclusion is Boucher where a government agent watched the
defendant decrypt his computer once before.246 In comparison, in Doe III,
the government put forward no evidence that the defendant was able to
decrypt.247 Fricosu and Feldman present an interesting middle ground
where the courts’ decisions were based on circumstantial evidence.248
Once the government shows that the accused’s ability to decrypt is a
foregone conclusion, then “no constitutional rights are touched.”249
However, courts have also said that the content and control of a device must
also be a foregone conclusion. But, as I will argue, decryption does not
communicate content and control and so requiring these things to be a
foregone conclusion is erroneous.
C. Decryption Does Not Communicate the Existence of a
Device’s Contents
Along with requiring the government to know that the witness can
decrypt, every court has required that the government be able to know that
the device contains information.250 However, decryption communicates
244

Id.
See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *5-6 (D. Va. Nov. 29 2007); In re
Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-5 (D. Va. Feb. 19 2007); United States v. Fricosu,
841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1346-47; Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162,
at *2.
246 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *3.
247 Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1346.
248 Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1236; Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2. The Fricosu court
adopted an evidentiary standard where the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is able to decrypt. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. The Feldman court did not
follow this evidentiary standard expressly; it did not say what evidentiary standard it was applying.
Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2. This Comment is consciously avoiding the question of how much
knowledge the government must have before something becomes a foregone conclusion. However, I am
concerned that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard could result in injustice. There is a
possibility that one could be compelled to decrypt a device that one does not have access to. For
instance, if there are multiple users to a device, one user could have an inability to access a particular
area or volume of a device. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 n.9 (“[T]here was no evidence that [the
defendant] was the only person who had access to his hard drives.”). Holding that person in contempt
for being unable to do the impossible would result in a serious injustice. Courts should consider
adopting a “clear and convincing” evidence standard instead. See Aaron M. Clemens, comment, No
Computer Exception to the Constitution: The Fifth Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production
of an Encrypted Document or Private Key, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2 (2004).
249 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976); Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1346.
250 See cases cited supra note 224. Despite Doe III being the only case where the court upheld the
defendant’s claim of privilege against self-incrimination, courts are not necessarily split on the issue. See
245

37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 222 Side B
01/11/2016 08:19:25

C M
Y K

37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 223 Side A

01/11/2016 08:19:25

18 - JARONE_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

An Act of Decryption Doctrine

1/4/16 11:36 PM

793

nothing about the device’s contents. If there are no communications as to
the contents of a device, the government should not need to know about it.
Decryption is different than physically producing documents. This is
perhaps an obvious point—but an important one nonetheless—because
different actions will implicitly communicate different things. Entering in a
password to decrypt will implicitly communicate something different from
physically going out and searching for documents and producing them in
response to a subpoena.
This premise is rooted in the Supreme Court’s cases.251 In Hubbell and
Fisher, the Court indicated that production of documents implicitly
communicates that the documents existed and the accused controlled the
documents.252 Importantly though, it was the means by which the accused
would produce the documents that communicated existence and control.253
The Court in Hubbell put great weight on the fact that the accused would
have had to “make extensive use ‘of the contents of his own mind’ in
identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the
subpoena.”254 The “assembly” of the documents resulted in the act being
testimonial.255 Conversely, in Doe II, the accused did not need to go out and
assemble any documents—he just executed a directive—and so the accused
did not implicitly communicate existence and control of the documents to
the government.256
Decryption is more like executing a release for foreign bank records
than the assembly of documents.257 In both executing a release and
decryption, the accused is not required to use the contents of his mind to

01/11/2016 08:19:25
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Feldman I, No. 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 116993, *3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013). Whether an act is
testimonial depends on the “facts and circumstances of particular cases.” Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. At
least on this point, the legal rule has not differed significantly between courts, instead the “facts and
circumstances” have differed. It is, for example, altogether possible that courts in the Eleventh Circuit
would permit compelled decryption should a case be factually similar to Boucher or Fricosu. See Doe
III, 670 F.3d at 1348-49 (distinguishing Boucher and Fricosu and adopting a similar rule as those cases
in dicta).
251 See Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The forced execution of this
document differs from the forced production of physical evidence just as human beings differ from other
animals.”).
252 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. (“The assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall
safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.”) (emphasis added); see also Cole, supra
note 75, at 182 (“The Court concluded that the mental efforts required by a witness to assemble and
produce subpoenaed documents was like testifying to the combination to a wall safe . . . .”).
256 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 215.
257 See id.; see also Philip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 204 (1997) (noting an analogy between decryption and executing a directive).
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assemble anything.258 Also in both cases, the accused does some physical
act to give the government access to the information.259 The accused in no
way “points” the government to incriminating information but allows the
government to use “the independent labor of its officers” to conduct the
investigation.260 The government, after compelling the accused to decrypt,
does not force the accused to go through huge amounts of data and identify
incriminating evidence—that would bring it much more in line with
Hubbell.
Consider the following. Decryption generally requires one to enter a
password into a device to make it readable.261 However, technology is also
available which allows one to lock a device biometrically (e.g., fingerprint
locking).262 If the government sought to compel decryption of a
biometrically locked device, it could do so without implicating the Fifth
Amendment.263 Decryption using a biometric lock would involve a purely
physical act, no different really than compelling someone to provide a
blood sample or stand in a line up for identification.264 In other words, it
would be a non-testimonial act.265 It would no more communicate what was
within an encrypted device than providing a DNA sample would
communicate a DNA sequence.266
If a court would find that using a biometrical lock does not implicitly
communicate the contents of a device, then it should also find that entering
a password does not implicitly communicate the contents of a device. In
neither case is the accused required to identify or collect evidence against
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258 See Reitinger, supra note 257, at 177-78 (“[E]ncryption is far more like storing a document
on a computer or locking it in a safe than translating it. . . . Encryption . . . is a purely mechanistic
process that does not of necessity add, subtract, or alter information . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
259 Id.
260 See Doe II, 487 U.S. at 215.
261 See generally Section II.A.
262 See, e.g., Fingerprint Lock Free, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.nb.fingerprint.lock.free (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (fingerprint lock on Android phone);
PLAY,
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
iOS
Fingerprint
Lock
Screen,
GOOGLE
details?id=com.creativeinc.iphone5s.fingerprint.lockscreen&hl=en (last visited Mar. 28, 2014)
(fingerprint lock on iPhone); Iron Key F200 Flash Drives, IRON KEY, http://www.ironkey.com/en-US/
encrypted-storage-drives/f200.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (fingerprint lock on USB drive). See
generally Colin Soutar et al., Biometric Encryption, in ICSA GUIDE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY (Randal K.
Nicols ed. 1999).
263 See Marcia Hofmann, Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’, WIRED
(Sept. 13 2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/the-unexpected-result-of-fingerprintauthentication-that-you-cant-take-the-fifth/.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Providing a DNA sample is a non-testimonial act. See, e.g., United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d
766, 774 (7th Cir. 2006). Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a blood sample
is non-testimonial).
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himself or herself but instead is required to allow the government to read
the device.267
The major distinguishing feature between decryption and executing the
bank records is that, as I have already discussed, decryption implicitly
communicates that the accused has access to the device. But the directive in
Doe II was carefully written as to not communicate that the accused had
access to the foreign bank accounts.268
This distinction goes away when the accused’s ability to access the
device is a foregone conclusion. The Supreme Court said the execution of
the directive in Doe II was like a handwriting exemplar.269 The Court has
also said that an exemplar has testimonial qualities, but that these
testimonial qualities are almost always a foregone conclusion.270 Thus if it
is a foregone conclusion that one is able to decrypt, then the act of
decryption is really no different, at least in testimonial value, from a
handwriting exemplar.
D. Decryption Does Not Communicate Possession or Control of a Device

267

See Phillip R. Reitinger, supra note 257, at 177-78.
Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988).
269 Id. at 217.
270 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
271 See id. at 410. It would be, generally, quite unlikely that a normal citizen could produce
someone else’s tax records because the citizen does not possess or control them.
272 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 215.
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Decryption of a device does not communicate either that one has
control of contents of a device or possession of a device. In Fisher, one
necessarily had to have possession or control over the subpoenaed
documents to produce them for the government.271 However, decryption is
distinct in several ways. First, someone using encryption can tell someone
else the password to one’s encrypted device. That third-party can certainly
decrypt but does not necessarily have control or possession of the device.
Second, usually in these decryption cases, the government possesses and
controls the device because it was seized. The accused does not have
control over the device but instead can access it. Third, in Doe II, the
Supreme Court never required the government to know that the defendant
had control of the foreign bank records before compelling the execution of
the directive.272 Similarly, in entering in a password, one does not implicitly
say that one has control over the device’s contents.

268
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E. If Decryption Did Communicate Contents and Control, then the Lower
Courts’ Analysis Would Still Be Flawed
Even assuming that decryption did communicate the contents of a
device, lower courts are incorrectly applying Supreme Court precedent. If
decryption did communicate content, then compelled decryption would be
very much like a categorical request for documents. This sort of categorical
request was rejected in Hubbell.273
The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, adopted a rule requiring that the
government know of the existence of some files before compelling
decryption.274 But the government, in these cases, is seeking decryption of
the entire device—not the production of certain files.275 The Eleventh
Circuit seems to be saying that so long as the government has knowledge of
some files it can compel the decryption of the entire device.276 The Supreme
Court in Hubbell did not say that if the government knew of the existence
of some documents, it could successfully compel the production of an entire
category of documents.277 The lower court’s analysis, if applied consistently
with Hubbell, would permit unconstitutional fishing expeditions.278
A consistent application of Hubbell would require the defendant to
produce specific files and not the entire content of a device. Alternatively,
courts should require a comprehensive listing of every file on a device, or
require the prosecution provide use and derivational use immunity for those
files it does not know about prior to compelling decryption. Fortunately
however, these remedies are not necessary because the premise that
decryption communicates contents is incorrect.

I have argued that decryption implicitly communicates that one is able
to decrypt but does not communicate the contents of a device or one’s
control of a device. Following from this, if the witness’s ability to decrypt is
273
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United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2000).
Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 n.28 (11th Cir. 2012).
275 Id. at 1339; United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238 (D. Colo. 2012); Feldman
II, No. 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 116993 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013).
276 Id. at 1249 n.28.
277 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 (“[T]he Government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge
of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by
respondent.”); see also Cole, supra note 75, at 185 (arguing that a broad request for documents became
more difficult under Hubbell because there is a greater burden on the government to show knowledge of
the documents).
278 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42; see In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (Nov. 29,
2007) (“By compelling entry of the password the government would be compelling production of all the
files on [the device], both known and unknown. . . . [T]he files the government has not seen could add
much to the sum total of the government’s information.”).
274
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279 An example of this occurred when the defendant in Boucher entered in the password to his
laptop after waiving his Miranda Rights.
280 Cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (holding a communication at a grand jury
proceeding is voluntary if one incriminates oneself but does not assert a privilege against selfincrimination).
281 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 88 (1968).
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a foregone conclusion, then decryption is a non-testimonial act. This nontestimonial act would allow the government to gain access to a potential
source of information, but would not assist the government in locating or
compiling evidence.
I suggest a two part analysis. First, courts should ask whether the act of
decryption is presumptively privileged. As discussed in part III.A, the act of
entering the password is generally going to be testimonial—it implicitly
communicates an ability to access the device.
For the privilege to attach however, decryption must also be compelled
and incriminating. In some cases, decryption may not be compelled. For
example, one can voluntarily decrypt either during custodial interrogation279
or during a grand jury proceeding.280 Similarly, one’s act of decryption is
not always incriminating. If the danger of self-incrimination is “imagined
and unsubstantial,” then the government has the power to compel a
testimonial act.281 For example, if the defendant has child pornography on
his or her computer and a witness saw the defendant enter in the password,
the witness could be compelled to decrypt the device because there would
be no danger that decryption would incriminate the witness. Alternatively,
if the government grants immunity for the act of decryption, then one’s act
is no longer incriminatory and can be compelled.
If the defendant can meet the initial burden of showing that decryption
is (1) testimonial, (2) compelled, and (3) incriminatory, then the privilege
against self-incrimination attaches. However, as the Court in Doe I stated,
the government then can offer evidence to show that the defendant’s ability
to decrypt is a foregone conclusion. If the government can meet this burden,
then, it may compel the witness to decrypt the device because decryption
would not increase the “sum total” of the government’s knowledge.
One could argue that the act of decryption analysis above may permit
the government to compel decryption as part of fishing expeditions. In other
words, because the government is not required to know anything about the
contents of a device, it could compel decryption and ransack the device
should one’s ability to decrypt be a foregone conclusion. This would
implicate privacy interests along with granting the government an
overbroad power to search one’s personal, digital effects.
In response, the discussion here is just in regard to the Fifth
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Amendment. There are other protections and parts of the Constitution; the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is just one
check against government power.282 The Fourth Amendment for example
still restrains the government’s ability to search one’s digital devices.283
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment’s concern is not that of privacy.284 The
Court has recognized that the government’s access to a person’s papers is
mostly unfettered regardless of a paper’s personal nature so long as the
Fourth Amendment requirements are met.285 Similarly, having private
information contained on a computer is irrelevant for a Fifth Amendment
analysis.
V. AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM: THE ACCUSED’S REFUSAL TO DECRYPT
As this Comment argues, the law is equipped to adjudicate whether a
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282 Cf. Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 214 (1988) (“[I]t should be remembered that there are many
restrictions on the government’s prosecutorial practices in addition to the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Indeed, there are other protections against governmental efforts to compel an unwilling suspect to
cooperate in an investigation, including efforts to obtain information from him. We are confident that
these provisions, together with the Self-Incrimination Clause, will continue to prevent abusive
investigative techniques.”) (footnotes omitted).
283 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see John E. D. Larkin, Compelled Production of
Encrypted Data, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L 253, 258 (2012). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
Seizures in A Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005) (discussing ways of analyzing the searches
of computers).
284 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976) (“The proposition that the Fifth
Amendment protects private information obtained without compelling self-incriminating testimony is
contrary to the clear statements of this Court that under appropriate safeguards private incriminating
statements of an accused may be overheard and used in evidence, if they are not compelled at the time
they were uttered, and that disclosure of private information may be compelled if immunity removes the
risk of incrimination. If the Fifth Amendment protected generally against the obtaining of private
information from a man’s mouth or pen or house, its protections would presumably not be lifted by
probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. The privacy invasion is not mitigated by immunity; and
the Fifth Amendment’s strictures, unlike the Fourth’s, are not removed by showing reasonableness. The
Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment. They struck a
balance so that when the State’s reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes
sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue.
They did not seek in still another Amendment the Fifth to achieve a general protection of privacy but to
deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.”); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401) (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s more recent opinions indicate that Boyd’s foundations have eroded. The Court no longer views
the Fifth Amendment as a general protector of privacy or private information, but leaves that role to the
Fourth Amendment. . . . Self-incrimination analysis now focuses on whether the creation of the thing
demanded was compelled and, if not, whether the act of producing it would constitute compelled
testimonial communication.”); Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.6 (1984); Terzian, supra note 1, at 307.
285 See cases cited supra note 284. I say mostly because other privileges may apply. For example,
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, or perhaps some kind of exception applying to national
security.
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See Larkin, supra note 283, at 276.
David Kravets, Defendant Ordered to Decrypt Laptop May Have Forgotten Password,
WIRED, (Feb. 06, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/forgotten-password/; Doe
III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendant claiming in the alternative that he forgot the
password to his device).
288 See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966) (“[T]he justification for coercive
imprisonment as applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with the
court’s order.”); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75 (1948).
289 See Larkin, supra note 283, at 276.
290 Id.
291 See Chase Bates, comment, Unbreakable: The Fifth Amendment and Computer Passwords,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1293, 1313 (2012). See generally D. Forest Wolfe, The Government’s Right to Read:
287
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defendant may be compelled to decrypt. The law, however, is not equipped
to address what happens after the compulsion. The accused in such
situations faces two possibilities: decrypt and allow the government access
to the evidence or not decrypt and face contempt of court.286 While a
defendant in contempt can be incarcerated, the device remains encrypted.
This hinders law enforcement’s ability to use the contents of the device to
investigate further crimes such as during a child pornography investigation
where the government is seeking the child pornography distributor.
When one is compelled to decrypt, one could say that he or she forgot
the password. The defendant in Fricosu, after the court ordered her to
decrypt her device, “claimed” to have forgotten the password.287 Whether
that claim is true or not is nearly impossible to determine, but the more time
that passes, the more likely it is to become true. If the defendant cannot
remember the password and can no longer decrypt, then the coercive
purpose of contempt would become inapplicable. Holding such a person in
contempt would do nothing more than coerce him or her to do something
that he or she is unable to accomplish, possibly opening up a defense of
impossibility.288
One may choose contempt over decryption to avoid conviction for a
sufficiently serious crime.289 One scholar has suggested a missing witness
instruction as a means to deal with the problem of a refusal to decrypt.290
This suggestion could help solve the problem of a refusal to decrypt in
some cases but not all. For example, in a case where the specific nature of
the records is important to investigate a crime, a missing witness instruction
may not be helpful. Also, the content of a drive may be important to future
investigations, such as finding the distributor of child pornography.
Alternatively, in a situation where there are national security risks,
prosecution is of secondary importance to decryption and preventing
catastrophe.
Some have argued for increased regulation of encryption
technology.291 First of all, this argument has First Amendment problems.292
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But as a more practical matter, the nature of online distribution and the
existence of free and open source encryption software make strict regulation
a losing proposition.293
Regardless, for all this discussion of compelled decryption, courts may
be better off not going down the compelled decryption road. Instead, the
solution to these problems lies in technological advancements in
cryptology, computer science, and law enforcement techniques.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Between writing the Comment and being selected for publication,
another important compelled decryption case was decided, Commonwealth
v. Gelfgatt.294 Gelfgatt, a 6-2 decision holding the Commonwealth could
compel decryption, displays the importance carefully considering the
differences between the product of documents and decryption.295
In this case, the defendant was accused of several counts of forgery,
fraud, and larceny. He had encrypted several electronic storage devices.296
The Commonwealth believed evidence of the defendant’s crimes could be
found on those devices.297 The defendant had informed law enforcement
that the devices were encrypted and that he could decrypt, but he refused to
do so.298
The Massachusetts Supreme Court’s analysis follows that of Doe III,
Boucher, and Fricosu (though includes few citations to those cases).299
First, it determined that “at first blush” entering in the password is
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Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption, 49 EMORY L.J. 711
(2000).
292 See Adam C. Bonin, comment, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment Challenges
to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 505-08 (1996); Robert Post, Encryption
Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713 (Spring 2000); Elizabeth Lauzon,
note, The Philip Zimmermann Investigation: The Start of the Fall of Export Restrictions on Encryption
Software Under First Amendment Free Speech Issues, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1307, 1337-51 (1998); see
also Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because computer source code is an
expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer programming, we hold that
it is protected by the First Amendment.”).
293 See Paul Zimmerman, Why I Wrote PGP, http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/ (last
visited on Feb. 13, 2014) (“If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy. . . . PGP empowers
people to take their privacy into their own hands. There has been a growing social need for it. That’s
why I wrote it.”).
294 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014).
295 See id. at 617. The court also held compelled production did not offend the state constitution.
See id. at 616-17.
296 Id. at 608.
297 Id. at 611.
298 Id. at 610-11
299 In fact, the majority only cites Fricosu and the dissent cites both Doe III (favorably) and
Fricosu (unfavorably).
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sufficiently communicative to trigger Fifth Amendment protection.300
However, it stated the foregone conclusion exception permitted decryption
if the government could show that it knew “(1) the existence of the
evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the
defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence.”301 The court concluded
that these facts were a foregone conclusion, in part, because of the
defendant’s own statements indicating he could decrypt if he wanted to.302
Although the court does not say it clearly, it does seem to indicate that it is
sufficient that the government knew that: (1) the defendant had control over
the devices; (2) the device was encrypted, and (3) the defendant knew the
encryption key.303
Curiously missing from the majority’s analysis is a discussion of the
government’s knowledge as to the existence of evidence on the device and
the defendant’s control over that evidence.304 In fact, the dissent criticizes
the majority saying,
[T]he court adopts the Commonwealth’s contention that, by decrypting
the computers and thereby producing their unencrypted contents, the
defendant would be asserting only his ability to decrypt the devices.
On this view, he would not be asserting that he owned them, had
exclusive use and control of them, or was familiar with any files on
them; that certain files contained the incriminating evidence sought; or
that the documents were authentic.305
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Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 614.
Id.
302 See id. at 615.
303 See id.
304 See id. at 615-16.
305 See Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 618 (Lenk, J., dissenting). The dissent took issue with the
insufficiency of the government’s knowledge as to what was contained within the encrypted devices.
See id. at 620-21. The dissent would require the government to have particular knowledge of what a
device contains. Id. at 622-23. The dissent fails to consider (and does not even cite) Doe II where the
United States Supreme Court held that opening up a potential source of evidence does not implicitly
communicate anything about that source of evidence. See generally id.
301
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Here, the dissent is correct in recognizing that, notwithstanding the
majority’s own characterization of the rule, the majority was focused on
whether it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant could decrypt and
not the other act of production doctrine requirements.
As this Comment argues, decryption does not implicitly communicate
exclusive use, control, or familiarity with files contained within a device. If
the production of physical documents were anything like compelled
decryption, the dissent would be correct to chastise the majority. But it is
not.
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The confused analysis in this case displays the need for a more careful
consideration of the act of production doctrine’s relationship to compelled
decryption. The majority’s decision was messy, but perhaps the reason it
was messy is that it would not make sense to strictly apply the act of
production doctrine to compelled decryption cases without recognizing the
differences between decryption and production.
VI. CONCLUSION
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This Comment has argued that the lower courts are applying the
Supreme Court’s act of production doctrine improperly. The courts have
failed to recognize that the witness is not, himself, producing anything at
all—not in the same way that a defendant produced things in Hubbell,
Fisher, and Doe I. Rather, the witness is typing in a password. So long as it
is a foregone conclusion that the witness knows the password, the
government should be able to compel the witness to enter it. Because the
lower courts have misapplied the doctrine, they have provided greater
protection for encryption users than what the Constitution requires. This
Comment’s intent is not to advocate for a limitation on an individual’s
interest in not incriminating himself or herself but to assist in the creation of
a clear rule for when the privilege does or does not apply.
In the end, should someone not wish to decrypt, the government
cannot do much to get access to the encrypted material. Although this
Comment has argued for clarification in the law, I am unconvinced that the
law will have much to do with battling the growing problem with
encryption. Judges, prosecutors, academics, and Congress will not solve
this problem; cryptographers, forensic investigators, computer scientists,
and law enforcement will solve the problem.
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